The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) 
I Introduction
On 29 August 2012, New Zealand's most notorious sex offender, Stewart Murray Wilson, the so-called 'Beast of Blenheim', was released from prison. 1 Wilson was convicted in 1996 of a host of heinous offences committed over twenty-five years, including seven counts of rape and charges of bestiality, indecent assault, ill treatment of children and stupefaction. 2 Although Heron J thought preventive detention was appropriate, it could only be imposed in respect of a rape offence occurring after 1 September 1993. 3 It was not certain Wilson's offending satisfied this requirement and
Heron J was forced to impose a finite sentence of twenty-one years. 4 When Wilson's final release date approached, he had to be released, despite being assessed as highly likely to sexually reoffend and having been repeatedly denied parole on that basis.
5
Wilson was released subject to various conditions imposed by the Parole Board until 2015 and from thereafter, an extended supervision order (ESO).
6
Wilson, and other similar offenders, who are not sentenced to preventive detention, but who are evaluated as overwhelmingly likely to sexually re-offend at the end of their sentences, present a quandary for the New Zealand justice system. Under the status quo, these offenders must be released and may be subject to similar restrictions as Wilson received. However, these restrictions are seen by some as insufficient to protect the public from the serious harm posed by such offenders. To combat this perceived public safety issue, the National-led Government introduced the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill (the Bill), to Parliament on 18 September 2012. 7 The Bill would enable the High Court to make a public protection order (PPO)
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6
As such, one of the principles included in the Bill is that individuals subject to a PPO should have "as much autonomy and quality of life as possible".
12

B Requirements for the Imposition of a PPO
To be eligible for a PPO, an individual must be 18 years or older, detained under a determinate sentence for a serious sexual or violent offence and be within six months of his or her release. 13 An individual subject to the most serious form of an ESO is also eligible. 14 The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections can apply to the High Court for a PPO in respect of such individuals if there is a high risk of imminent serious sexual or violent offending.
15
In the application, the Chief
Executive must include at least two reports prepared by health assessors, including a registered psychologist, that address whether that risk exists and whether the individual exhibits a high level of four behavioural characteristics.
16
These characteristics are specified in cl 13 as:
(a) an intense urge to commit a particular form of offending;
(b) limited self-regulatory capacity, evidenced by general impulsiveness, high emotional reactivity, and inability to cope with, or manage, stress and difficulties;
(c) absence of understanding or concern for the impact of offending on actual or potential victims;
(d) poor interpersonal relationships or social isolation or both.
17
The court can make a PPO if satisfied the individual meets the threshold and there is a very high risk of imminent serious sexual or violent offending. 18 To do this, the court 12 Cl 5. 13 Cl 7. 14 Cl 7. 15 Cl 8. 16 Cl 9. 17 Cl 13. 18 Cl 13.
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19
Once issued, an established review panel frequently reviews a PPO. 20 Additionally, within the first five years of a PPO, the court must review the continuing justification for the order, including the individual's eligibility for release. 21 An individual subject to a PPO can apply to the court to conduct such a review.
22
C Conditions of Detention under a PPO
Individuals subject to a PPO, known as "residents", are to be detained in a residence, a secure facility on prison grounds. 23 Residents have the rights of individuals not subject to a PPO, except to the extent the Bill limits those rights. 24 All residents are entitled to earnings from work, to vote, access the media and obtain a benefit.
25
Residents have the right to receive visits and written and oral communications from people outside the residence, although such visits and communications can be withheld or monitored. 26 Residents also have the right to rehabilitative treatment.
27
While a resident's rights can be limited, such decisions must be guided by reasonableness, proportionality and giving effect to the resident's autonomy and quality of life. 28 The Bill also makes provisions for searches of the resident and drug and alcohol tests. 29 A resident can be placed in seclusion or restrained in strict circumstances.
30
When a resident begins their stay, the residence manager must, in consultation with the resident, assess their needs. This must take into account the cultural or religious serious violent offences. 45 The referendum was overwhelmingly supported by 92% of the public, signalling the public wanted a more punitive approach to criminal justice.
The emergence of penal populism was solidified by the 2001 formation of the law and order lobby group, the Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST). 46 The SST quickly rose to prominence in the media and politics on a campaign of tougher sentences for violent offenders, based on protecting and upholding victims' rights. 47 It remains a popular voice today.
Penal populism and the Fifth National Government
The Fifth National Government has embraced penal populism over its last two terms in government. Prior to the 2008 election, the crux of National's law and order policy was "no parole for the worst repeat violent offenders".
48
The "two strikes, no walking" policy sought to prioritise the public's right to safety and re-characterise parole as a privilege, not a right.
49
This was given effect in 2010 with the implementation of the "three strikes" regime. 50 "Three strikes" was originally an SST policy.
51
The regime limits judges' discretion in sentencing repeat serious violent offenders.
On a second strike, the judge must order the offender serve his or her sentence without parole and on a third strike, must impose the maximum term of imprisonment available and order that be served without parole, unless manifestly unjust. 52 This is an example of penal populism because it demonstrates National responding to, as noted in the Regulatory Impact Statement, a "public concern" about repeat violent 45 offending. 53 The scheme was designed to "enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system" by satisfying the public's appetite for harsher punishment of these kinds of offenders, and in doing so, "improve public safety".
54
Similar rhetoric was employed prior to the 2011 election, where National's law and order policy focussed on "protecting the community" and "building a safer New Zealand. In particular, it explains why the Government proposed the Bill and why it enjoys public support.
B Public Attitudes Towards Sex Offenders
Common misconceptions regarding sex offenders
The public attitude towards sex offenders is typified by a perception sex offenders are inherently different from other offenders.
65
The reason for this is that sex offences create a moral panic, producing more public fear and anger than other crimes.
66
Consequently, sex offenders are the most stigmatised offenders in society and are despised even by other criminals. 67 They are seen as the worst offenders and the types of punishment sex offenders 'deserve', such as registration and chemical castration, differ from other offenders.
68
Moreover, there is an inclination to view all sex offenders in an essentialist manner.
Evidence does not support the view sex offenders are identical -offending differs in conduct, ranging from exhibitionism to rape and the motive for and underlying causes of offending are diverse. 69 Nonetheless, sex offenders are grouped together and typically seen as predators, who prey on children or women, unknown to them, in a public place. 70 This perception arises from the media portrayal of sex offenders, which is to focus on the worst instances of offending and report in a sensationalist way.
71
In reality, while that type of offending does occur, the majority of sex However, the most pervasive and worrying misconception is that sex offenders, as a group, are the most likely to reoffend. It is commonly believed the rate of recidivism amongst sex offenders is substantially higher than other offenders. 73 Many authors have held there is no conclusive evidence supporting this view and that instead the inverse is true. 74 The public belief that sex offenders are highly likely to reoffend is underscored by a perception sex offenders cannot be cured. 75 Theories have posited "sexual interests are imprinted on the brain in the same way as language" such that if an offender has a predilection to sexually offend, it cannot be changed.
76
This has fostered a public attitude that treatment and rehabilitation programmes are futile and resources should instead be shifted towards the incapacitation of sex offenders.
77
While the efficacy of various treatment measures is yet to be properly ascertained, there is no decisive evidence sex offenders are incurable. The primary effect of the Bill is to detain sex offenders beyond the expiration of their prison sentences. There are three reasons why the public is in favour of such a 72 Martin, above n 40, at 3; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 586. 73 Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 585. 74 Thakker, above n 71, at 149; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 585-586. 75 Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 70, at 220. 76 Fedoroff and Moran, above n 67, at 270. 77 Thakker, above n 71, at 160; Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 70, at 218. 78 Thakker, above n 71, at 160. 79 Thakker, above n 71. 80 Thakker, above n 71, at 160. As New Zealand's most prolific sex offender, whose case has dominated news and print media, Wilson has come to be the public face of sex offenders in the country.
Given the pervasiveness of Wilson's case, it is unsurprising the public support the present Bill.
IV Consistency with NZBORA
Conceptual understanding aside, it is important to analyse the practical effect of the Bill. The Bill imposes further detention on offenders after the expiration of their finite sentence, based on their predicted likelihood to reoffend. This very concept strikes at the heart of a number of Western legal traditions, most notably, an individual's right to liberty. For some, this concern may be lessened because the whom the majority of the population dislikes. 83 The strength of a legal system is often judged by the extent to which it protects the rights of those very people and therefore, the effect of the Bill on individual rights must be assessed.
In New Zealand, that assessment must be made in the context of NZBORA.
NZBORA is a statutory bill of rights, enacted with the dual purpose of affirming, After the Bill's introduction, the Government maintained PPOs were a form of civil detention. This focused on the purpose of the Bill, which is public protection, rather than punishment. 92 Specifically, because the Bill provided for detention in a civil detention facility and allowed individuals a high degree of autonomy, the Government argued it appropriately balanced the competing rights at stake.
93
In October 2012, the Attorney-General issued a statement explaining why, in his opinion, the Bill was consistent with NZBORA. 
V Is Post-Sentence Detention Civil or Penal in Nature?
The essential question in determining whether the Bill is compliant with NZBORA is whether the detention imposed under the Bill is civil or penal in nature. The first consideration must be the decision in Belcher, which was the primary basis for the Attorney-General's argument such detention was civil.
A Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections
Belcher is a decision of the New was a criminal conviction and eligibility depended on an application before an offender's sentence expired or while they were subject to release conditions.
102
Second, the consequences of an ESO were "in effect a subset of the sanctions which can be imposed on offenders", including up to 12 months home detention.
103
Ultimately, it was thought the "imposition through the criminal justice system of significant restrictions (including detention) on offenders in response to criminal behaviour" amounted to punishment. Third, the making of a PPO is "distinct from the penal and parole system" unlike ESOs, which are made by the court that imposed the sentence of imprisonment that triggered eligibility for an ESO. 110 While the Attorney-General was correct in asserting the significance of the separation of the making PPOs from the penal system, his other two arguments are not as certain and require further attention.
B Case Law from Comparable Jurisdictions
While the decision in Belcher provides a starting point for analysing the AttorneyGeneral's statement, there is a wealth of case law from other jurisdictions to be considered. The United States and Australia are especially relevant as both have postsentence detention regimes for sex offenders, which raise similar human rights issues.
National courts in both countries, and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations (UNHRC), have adjudicated on the human rights consistency of the schemes. In the absence of any direct New Zealand authority, these decisions provide valuable guidance. Before these decisions are taken into account, a background history of the schemes will be provided.
The United States
The United States has a long history of civil committal for recidivist sex offenders, dating back to the 1930s. 111 The current schemes were developed in the 1990s and focus on sex offenders seen as too dangerous to release. 
VI Mental Requirement for Civil Committal
Returning to the Attorney-General's statement, the first issue for consideration is the whether the Bill establishes a form of civil committal. The Attorney-General believed that it did because of the cl 13 requirement that an individual exhibit a "severe disturbance in behavioural functioning". This is based on the traditional understanding of civil committal, which applies to individuals with some form of mental impairment.
A New Zealand
In New Zealand, civil committal of those with a mental disorder is provided for in the Zealand. This acknowledgment is of crucial importance for the Bill. If the Bill is to be construed as civil, it means the threshold for civil committal in New Zealand is necessarily being widened.
B The United States
This issue was also confronted in Hendricks, where a "mental abnormality or personality disorder" was required by the SVPA. Hendricks argued the SVPA was invalid because this lowered the traditional threshold for civil committal -a mental illness. 137 Thomas J recognised a finding of dangerousness alone was insufficient for civil committal; an "additional factor" such as mental illness was required. 138 This served the purpose of limiting committal to individuals "who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control". 139 In the majority's opinion, a "mental abnormality or personality disorder" sufficed as the "additional factor", because it would mean offenders were unable to control their 143 Hendricks too, then, lowers the standard for civil committal.
C Is the threshold too low?
The decision in Hendricks has been the subject of intense scrutiny. Many mental health professionals believe it unacceptably widens the threshold for civil committal. 144 Critics observe that while the meaning of mental illness is clear, with definitions, guidelines and evidentiary standards, "mental abnormality" is a legislative construct without the same characteristics.
145
Kennedy J, concurring with the majority in Hendricks, recognised this concern, stating the SPVA would be unconstitutional "if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified".
146
The Bill is vulnerable to the same critique. While a mental illness is not required in for civil committal in New Zealand, the Mental Health Act is clear as to what level of mental disorder is needed. This is a lower threshold than that applicable in the United
States, and the Bill further reduces it. This casts the net for civil commitment far too widely. Research demonstrates the majority of prisoners suffer from some sort of antisocial personality disorder and would satisfy requirements such as a "mental abnormality" or "severe disturbance in behavioural functioning". problematic when the purpose of the requirement is to limit those eligible for civil committal and prevent individuals being detained on dangerousness alone.
149
This suggests the Attorney-General and the court in Hendricks are wrong to conclude something less than the existing standard suffices to make the respective schemes forms of civil committal. If that is the case, it becomes easy to construe the schemes as merely a tool for the legislature to detain those it identifies as dangerous. Breyer J, dissenting in Hendricks, noted this concern.
150
That is troubling because dangerousness is tenuous basis for imprisonment, being based on predictions of future offending, which may never eventuate. Kirby J, dissenting in Fardon, regarded predictions of dangerousness as unreliable because they were often over predicted by psychiatrists and ultimately, only an "educated guess". 151 The UNHRC echoed this sentiment, stating dangerousness is an "inherently problematic" concept for similar reasons.
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D Concluding Remarks
The mental requirement in cl 13 does not conclusively establish the Bill is civil committal, contrary to the Attorney-General's assertion. However, it is important that the Bill, like the SVPA, includes some form of mental requirement. This contrasts with the schemes operating in Australia. For example, Queensland's DPSOA while requiring psychiatric evidence to be considered, does not require a finding of any sort of mental condition. rejected the DPSOA as a form of civil committal.
154
The Attorney-General's argument the Bill is civil in nature, is at least in that respect, more credible than its Australian counterparts.
VII Detention and Imprisonment
The Attorney-General's second reason in deciding detention under the Bill was civil was that its provisions give meaningful effect to the autonomy and quality of life of individuals. This nuanced argument contradicts the more obvious response that detention in a prison or a secure facility on prison grounds is the classic example of punishment, as suggested by theories of punishment.
A Theories of Punishment
The standard (e) must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.
Joel Feinberg accepted this definition, adding the qualification that punishment must serve an expressive function. 157 Feinberg's thesis was that, in addition to involving "hard treatment" ("pain or other consequences"), punishment expresses resentment, indignation and the judgments of disapproval and reprobation. 
B Substantive Analysis of Detention under the Bill
Breyer J, for the Hendricks' minority, took this approach and focussed on how the SVPA operated in practice. He noted detention under the SVPA was similar to imprisonment; it was "secure confinement… against one's will". 176 This, combined with the location of detention, meant it could be construed as punishment. 177 The Attorney-General correctly followed this approach, but reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the "prison-like conditions" of detention under the Bill, which appeared punitive in substance, were displaced by the focus on the individual's autonomy and rights.
178
To evaluate this argument it is important to distinguish between PPOs and PDOs, the 
VIII Implications for the Bill
It is clear the Bill has implications for compliance with human rights standards.
There are two particular issues -what mental requirement is needed for civil committal and whether detention under the Bill is, in substance, punishment.
It could be argued the Bill is an example of penal populism, where the Government, sensing the outrage in response to Wilson's pending release, acted to pass a Bill it knew would garner public support. The public's attitude towards offenders has become increasingly punitive, and the National-led Government has responded to this in the past, both in its electoral campaigns and in the "three strikes" regime. This suggestion is also strengthened by the common misconceptions the public has regarding sex offenders, such as their inability to be rehabilitated. If this were the case, the Bill would be a worrying example of the tyranny of the majority, perpetuated over the unpopular minority of sex offenders.
However, it would be wrong to characterise the Bill in such a way. Its provisions plainly demonstrate the Government has engaged with NZBORA concerns and tried to reduce inconsistencies. 
IX Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the validity of the Attorney-General's claim that the Public Safety (Public Protection Order) Bill is consistent with human rights.
At first glance, the concept of the Bill -the detention of sex-offenders beyond their finite sentences -suggested it would compromise core rights protected in NZBORA.
However, on closer inspection, it is clear the Bill has been drafted to engage with and lessen these concerns. The Attorney-General argued the Bill was a form of civil committal and that the detention it imposed was different to imprisonment. For the most part, these arguments are correct. However, the Attorney-General's analysis could have been more thorough with regard to the lowering of the threshold for civil committal and detention under PDOs, as discussed in this paper. On the whole, and in comparison to the schemes operating in the United States and Australia, the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between the competing interests at stake -public protection and human rights. 
The United States
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 42 USC § 1690.
Kan Stat Ann § 59-29a02.
Wash Rev Code § 71.09.
B International Conventions
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
C Cases
